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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
D.G.M. petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision to deny his application for 
deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the following 
reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
We write only for the parties, so our summary of the facts is brief.  D.G.M., a 
native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States in 2000.  In 2006, he pleaded 
guilty in federal court to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 
marijuana and to aiding and abetting the discharge of a firearm.  D.G.M. cooperated with 
authorities to provide information about his co-defendants and was sentenced to time 
served, or 41 months of imprisonment.  He was released in 2008.  Then, in 2016, D.G.M. 
was convicted of making interstate threats in connection with a family dispute.  In 2017, 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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he was placed into removal proceedings based on his 2006 conviction of an aggravated 
felony.  D.G.M. applied for CAT protection.   
D.G.M. proceeded pro se before the IJ.  In support of his application, D.G.M. 
testified about his prior cooperation, explaining that he had provided information about 
his co-defendants, six Jamaican individuals who “were involved with the drug trade.”  
Joint Appendix (“JA”) 294.  D.G.M. had testified against five of them in two separate 
trials.  Four of D.G.M.’s co-defendants were eventually convicted and sentenced to at 
least thirty-five years in prison.  D.G.M. testified that he feared returning to Jamaica 
because he would likely be harmed by his co-defendants or their families.  He explained 
that at one of the trials, two of the co-defendants threatened him.  D.G.M. stated that 
these individuals were Jamaican drug suppliers and from the same “ghetto” as him in 
Jamaica.  JA295. 
D.G.M. also testified that the co-defendants’ friends threatened him when he was 
in prison in 2007.  In 2009, one co-defendant, a United States citizen who had not been 
convicted, told D.G.M.’s girlfriend that he would kill D.G.M. when he saw him.  D.G.M. 
further testified that a Jamaican individual whom he did not know threatened him in 
prison in 2016, accusing D.G.M. of testifying against the individual’s friends and cutting 
D.G.M.’s palm with a sharp object.  D.G.M. stated that he fears harm if removed to 
Jamaica by the gang to which the co-defendants belonged, because they “still run the 
ghetto” in Jamaica.  JA303. 
The IJ found D.G.M. credible but denied relief under the CAT.  The IJ held that 
D.G.M.’s claim that he would likely be harmed if he was returned to Jamaica was 
4 
speculative because his co-defendants would not be released from prison until 2042 at the 
earliest and there was no evidence that their families reside in Jamaica.  The IJ also found 
that, in any event, D.G.M. was also “unable to establish likely Jamaican government 
acquiescence to his torture if he is removed.”  JA19.  The IJ reasoned that while there is 
corruption within the Jamaican government’s ranks, it “cooperate[s] with the United 
States in fighting against drug trafficking and organized crime” and the Jamaican 
government “continues to charge police officers with abuses as well as other government 
officials with corruption.”  JA18–19. 
The BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasoning and dismissed D.G.M.’s appeal on 
October 20, 2017.  D.G.M. timely filed a petition for review, and we appointed pro bono 
counsel to represent him.1 
II. 
The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3).  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review the BIA’s 
order.  However, because D.G.M. was convicted of an aggravated felony, our jurisdiction 
is limited to reviewing “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), as “factual or discretionary determinations are outside of our scope of 
review,” Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
 
1  We extend our gratitude to Jules Epstein and Rachel Goodman of Temple University 
Beasley School of Law for donating their time and talent in accepting this pro bono 
appointment and for zealously representing D.G.M. before our Court. 
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We review de novo the constitutional and legal questions raised by D.G.M.’s 
petition.  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010).  When, as here, the BIA 
adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s opinion, our 
review encompasses both decisions.  Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 729, 734 (3d Cir. 
2018). 
III. 
D.G.M. argues that the BIA applied the wrong standard when reviewing the IJ’s 
decision — that is, that the BIA did not review questions of law de novo and that its 
opinion was “too deferential and brief.”  D.G.M. Br. 9.  We disagree. 
To succeed on his CAT claim, D.G.M. had to demonstrate “that it is more likely 
than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to [Jamaica].”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 
F.3d 166, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).  He also needed to 
show that the torture would be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.18(a)(1).  Failure to meet either prong — likelihood of torture or acquiescence of 
public officials — is fatal to a claim for CAT protection. 
With respect to the second prong, the IJ first “makes a factual finding or findings 
as to how public officials will likely act in response to the harm the petitioner fears” and 
then “assesses whether the likely response from public officials qualifies as acquiescence 
under the governing regulations.”  Dutton-Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  The BIA reviews the first question for clear error and the second question de 
novo.  Id. at 516–17.  The BIA did so. 
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Here, the IJ made findings that the Jamaican government “cooperate[s] with the 
United States in fighting against drug trafficking and organized crime” and “charge[s] 
police officers with abuses as well as other government officials with corruption.”  JA18–
19.  Based on these findings, the IJ concluded that it was mere “speculation that the 
Jamaican government could be held responsible or complacent in any potential harm” to 
D.G.M.  JA19. 
The BIA explained that it reviewed how public officials will likely act for clear 
error and “whether the likely response constitutes acquiescence . . . de novo.”  JA13.  The 
BIA then reviewed the IJ’s findings that the evidence in the record showed both “some 
corruption amongst public officials in Jamaica” and also that “the Jamaican government 
charges police officers for their abuses and corruption.”  JA13.  The BIA concluded that 
the IJ correctly determined that D.G.M. had not presented evidence which could show 
that government officials would be willfully blind or otherwise acquiesce to acts of 
torture, and agreed with the IJ that D.G.M.’s testimony was “speculative, at best.”  JA13. 
We see no error in the BIA’s analysis.  It correctly cited the standard of review 
and did not improperly treat any legal conclusions as factual determinations.  The 
conclusion that no government official could be said to acquiesce in D.G.M.’s torture was 
fully consistent with the applicable legal standards.  And although the BIA’s opinion is 
short, brevity is not error.  The BIA “is not required to write an exegesis on every 
contention, but only to show that it has reviewed the record and grasped the movant’s 
claims.”  Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 178 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  The BIA has 
done so here. 
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There is no indication that the BIA ignored any relevant evidence with respect to 
acquiescence.  To the contrary, as the BIA and the IJ observed, the country conditions 
evidence submitted indicates that Jamaica’s government is actively opposing criminal 
activity.  See, e.g., JA357–60.  And because D.G.M.’s claim regarding “how public 
officials will likely act in response to the harm the petitioner fears” was speculative, 
Dutton-Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516, the BIA and the IJ correctly held that D.G.M. did not 
establish acquiescence.2   
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny D.G.M.’s petition for review.3  
 
2  The BIA also agreed with the IJ that D.G.M. had not met his burden of showing that he 
would be targeted for harm.  Because we affirm the BIA’s holding with respect to 
acquiescence, however, we need not reach D.G.M.’s challenge as to the likelihood of 
harm prong.  Nor do we reach D.G.M.’s argument that he was denied due process when 
the IJ did not retrieve and consider a corroborating letter from the Drug Enforcement 
Administration “detailing the nature of the threat he faces in Jamaica.”  D.G.M. Br. 17.  
This letter relates only to the likelihood of harm prong — that it is more likely than not 
that D.G.M. will be subjected to torture if returned to Jamaica — and does not implicate 
acquiescence.  And because failure to meet either prong is dispositive of a claim for CAT 
protection, D.G.M. cannot show “that substantial prejudice resulted” from any alleged 
due process violation.  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation 
marks omitted).   
3  In light of the above, D.G.M.’s pending motion for a remand to the BIA and to stay 
these proceedings filed on March 11, 2019, is denied as moot.   
